We describe work in progress that uses program analysis to show that security-critical programs, such as cross-domain guards, correctly enforce crossdomain security policies. We are enhancing existing techniques from the field of Security-oriented Programming Languages to construct a new language for the construction of secure networked applications, SELINKS. In order to specify and enforce expressive and fine-grained policies, we advocate dynamically associating security labels with sensitive entities. Programs written in SELINKS are statically guaranteed to correctly manipulate an entity's security labels and to ensure that the appropriate policy checks mediate all operations that are performed on the entity. We discuss the design of our main case study : a web-based Collaborative Planning Application that will permit a collection of users, with varying security requirements and clearances, to access sensitive data sources and collaboratively create documents based on these sources.
INTRODUCTION
Cross-domain security problems arise frequently in common military operations. For instance, every time there is a mission need to share information with coalition partners at varying levels of trust (e.g. U.K., Canada or non-NATO countries); with US Govern- ment entities (e.g. FBI, IRS); with deployed troops; or, say, with academic institutions, care must be taken to ensure that shared information is cleared at the appropriate classification level. In general, difficulties arise whenever the parties sharing information operate on different classification levels and further may be on different networks that are cleared at different classification levels. The problem is further complicated when considering messages with varying levels of data sensitivity. Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical, but typical, scenario in which enclaves of entities with varying clearance levels and responsibilities collaborate in a networked environment to achieve a common mission objective. Each network domain connects to the others via a cross-domain guard entity (CDG) at the edge of each domain -for instance, the armored vehicles at the edge of domains B and C. From a security perspective, the CDG is the element tasked with deciding whether or not packets routed between domains are to be transmitted. Information collected by soldiers in Network Domain B (packet Z) is communicated via the CDG to members of a coalition force in Network Domain C, and may be filtered by the CDG if it con-tains inappropriately sensitive information.
One approach to dealing with this problem is to defer security decisions to the specially designated CDG nodes in the network. Each CDG is tasked with scanning the data content of messages for particular patterns (e.g. troop location) and blocking or filtering messages accordingly. In this position paper, we argue that this approach is deficient in a number of ways and propose an alternative centered on constructing verifiably secure software using security-oriented programming languages. First, since the CDGs are the only security-oriented elements, obtaining an end-toend assurance for the entire system is difficult. Instead, by constructing the entire distributed system in a secure framework (possibly eliminating specially designated CDGs altogether) we can provide the necessary high level of assurance. Second, content-based filtering alone is error prone and can both be overly conservative in blocking messages that need to be shared, and unexpectedly permissive in allowing sensitive data to pass through. (Consider email spam filters as a case in point.) We present a preliminary design and outline a plan of future work for a framework in which the content of a message can be labeled with security policies (including filtering policies) and the propagation of labeled messages can be reliably tracked through the system. Our objective is to prove that applications constructed in this framework are provably compliant with a range of formal, yet practical, security goals.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the functionality and security goals of a realistic web-based document management and data aggregation application that integrates with the network of Figure 1 . In Section 3 we present a short review of existing techniques for the verified enforcement of policies specified using object labeling. In Section 4 we discuss a model for security labels. In Section 5 we describe some of the features of a new programming language we are building that allows cross-domain information flows to be secured. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the current status of our project and future directions.
A COLLABORATIVE PLANNING AP-PLICATION
We are building a web-based collaborative planning application (CPA) as a test bed in which to ex- periment with a variety of security policies and enforcement mechanisms. This CPA is designed to allow back-office analysts, field commanders and intelligence agents to collaboratively create documents. These documents could be situation reports, intelligence estimates, or independent assessments by principals at a combat site, each backed up by data gathered from an array of sources, such as video sensors or troop location information. Together, principals with different skill sets and responsibilities collaborate to construct actionable intelligence items for consumption by decision makers. Figure 2 illustrates, at a high-level, the structure of the CPA. The application is hosted by a web server shown toward the right of the figure. We expect the application to be integrated into the scenario from Figure 1 -as with all other cross-domain communication, requests to the CPA domain are dispatched through a CDG element. The figure shows several domains of sensor arrays that stream data to a collection of sensor databases via the CDG. The data in the sensor DBs are labeled with security labels. The form and content of these labels are discussed in detail in subsequent sections, but, for now, one might think of these as provenance labels-i.e. labels that identify the source of the data.
The basic architecture of the CPA is typical of multi-tiered web applications, found both in the military and in the public sector. The three tiers in this application consist of a client tier (at the top left) consisting of dynamic HTML running in a client's web browser; the web server; and server-side databases (the disks at the right). While this limited tier-based topology is much more restrictive than a generalized distributed systems (such as a P2P network), we believe it is a useful stepping stone towards more complex architectures. Our long-term objective is to scale our framework to handle more general scenarios.
There are three main security critical tasks that the CPA will perform in order to allow users of various security levels to collaboratively author reports.
Accurate tracking of labels on data sources. In order to author reports, users can issue queries via the CPA to the sensor DBs to extract curated data from the raw sensor data [1] . For two main reasons, it is important for the curated data to accurately reflect the security policies and provenance information of the raw data from which it is derived. First, accurately tracking data sources increases the credibility of the resulting report and permits auditing of a report should errors be discovered. Second, if the security policies of the raw data is not correctly associated with the curated data, then adversaries can easily mount attacks on the data sources by analysis of the curated data.
Tagging documents with dynamic policies. Security labels need not always originate from outside the CPA. Authors may introduce labels by associating them with various parts of a document. These labels can be used to indicate a security policy, the document's provenance as well as semantic tags such as document keywords that will assist other users with search. We support a very fine-grained document structure in which even individual characters in a document can potentially be labeled. Importantly, security policies are decentralized in that principals can specify labels independently of other principals. Similar to labels on data sources, document labels will also be tracked through all functions of the application -e.g. database queries that extract fragments of documents will have to accurately reflect the labels of fragments in the query results.
Complete mediation of policy authorization checks. The CPA must ensure that all sensitive operations on labeled objects are mediated by policy checks that are consistent with the intended meaning of the label. For instance, if the label on a datum is an MLS label, the CPA must make sure that the datum never flows to location with a lower MLS label.
We face four main technical challenges in constructing the CPA. First, we must design a language of labels that is sufficiently expressive to model a variety of common security policies. Second, we must be able to precisely track label flows through a variety of program operations in multiple tiers of an application (e.g. through database queries). Next, we must ensure that policy authorization checks that take place in the various tiers of the application are all mutually consistent (e.g. policy checks that occur in DB stored procedures have to have the same semantics as checks that occur in the web application). Finally, we must ensure that when labeled objects are communicated across a channel that the relationship between object and label is correctly preserved.
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss how we intend to perform each of the three main security critical tasks and address the four challenges of the CPA. We begin, however, with a short tutorial on SOPLs. For a more complete treatment, refer to Sabelfeld and Myers' excellent survey paper [5] .
A PRIMER ON SOPLs
Security-oriented programming languages (SOPLs) utilize automated static and dynamic program analyses to prove that programs enjoy certain security properties, usually expressed as restrictions on information flow. A SOPL makes these policies manifest in the program so they can be mechanically checked. Typically, these policies are expressed as labels on the types in the program. During the process of type checking, the compiler verifies that the labeled program does not violate the policy described by these types. To illustrate the basic features of an SOPL we present a very simple label model here. In subsequent sections we propose more complex label models and briefly describe our work that allows arbitrary user-defined labels to to be integrated into a secure programming framework for dynamic, distributed applications.
In the simple model, labels are a pair (L C , L I ), where L C stands for the confidentiality component and L I stands for the integrity component of label. Each component can be thought of as the name of a principal in the system. The security policy of a program consists of the label annotations that appear on types as well as a policy describing an acts-for hierarchy among principals. For instance, if the acts-for hierarchy specifies that Alice ≤ Bob (meaning that Bob acts for Alice), then Bob is permitted to observe all data that Alice is permitted to observe, and dually, Alice trusts the integrity of all data that Bob trusts. In this case, it is permissible for data with a label annotation (Alice, Bob) to flow to a location labeled (Bob, Alice). In this manner, the acts-for relation ≤ on principals can be extended naturally to a lattice ordering relation on labels (L C , L I ), where data with label lower in the lattice is permitted to flow to locations higher in the lattice. To ensure that a program does not contain any illegal information flows, the compiler tracks information flows through the program, and rejects programs that violate the security policy described by the type annotations and the label lattice.
A MODEL FOR SECURITY LABELS
Most existing security-typed languages use a lattice model of information flow [8] similar to the example of the previous section. While this simple label model is sufficient in a formal setting, in practice more expressive labels are required for several reasons. First, the lattice of labels may need to be changed during a longrunning program's execution. Second, while MLS information flow labels are useful in enforcing noninterference-like properties, other security policies such as downgrading, access control and data provenance tracking also need to be supported. In such cases, no natural lattice ordering on labels exists. In this section, we discuss a label model that supports dynamic policies, and can be enriched to support more than just information-flow policies.
DYNAMIC MLS LABELS
If policy updates are to be supported, a reasonable administrative model should be able to provide answers to the following questions. (1) Who is allowed to make changes to the security policy? (2) What parts of the policy are permitted to change? (3) How should those changes be reflected in the running program?
Rather than develop an administrative model for existing label models, we looked instead to the body of work on formal policy languages for which administrative models already exist. Role-based policy languages suggest a natural label model. In particular, a role, which is a name that represents a set of principals, can be treated as a label, and the ordering between labels can be defined in terms of subset on the contents of roles according to the policy. The language RT 0 provides a particularly convenient source of labels. RT 0 is the simplest member of the role-based policy language framework RT [4] . The following features of RT 0 roles provides answers to each three questions posed previously.
Ownership. An RT role is defined as having an owner responsible for the role's definition; a given principal can own many roles. Only a role's owner is allowed to change the definition of that role.
Membership and Delegation. An RT policy permits delegation at the granularity of roles, in which one role may be defined in part by the contents of another role. This provides better control than the standard lattice model, which only permits delegation between principals. The result is that in the standard model, principals either delegate all their privileges to another principal or none. By contrast, role membership and role delegation in RT are separate concepts. Roles have an owner, and membership is strictly under the owner's control: the owner can either include a principal in a role directly, or delegate (part of) the definition of a role to another role. Membership does not imply delegation.
Indirection. Defining labels as roles provides a useful level of indirection because the membership of a role may change while the label on data stays the same. That is, a security policy of some data can be modified without requiring the data to be relabeled.
Role ordering. Roles can conveniently be arranged on a lattice using the subset relation, since they can be interpreted as sets of principals. Alternatively, it is also possible to use the logical structure of the policy to define a partial order on roles. While the tradeoffs between the choices are beyond the scope of this paper, we note that both choices admit the specification of multi-level information flow policies.
We have formalized the use of roles as security labels in an SOPL that supports dynamic policy updates [7] .
OTHER FORMS OF LABELS
MLS information flow policies allow strong noninterference-like security properties to be expressed, but such a security goal is not always necessary or appropriate. One relaxation of noninterference that has been studied extensively is downgrading or declassification. This is of particular relevance to the cross-domain setting and policies for downgrading is the focus of a companion technical report [3] . In this section, we briefly sketch the form of labels that can be used to express access control policies and data provenance policies.
Access control labels. While MLS policies are datacentric (i.e., they control data flow) access control policies can be used more naturally to control actions as well as data. However, access control typically does not place constraints on the modes of usage of a sensitive object once access has been granted. For instance, under an access control policy, once a principal is granted access to a file, then she is free to copy contents of the file to another file governed by a weaker policy. This weakness of access control distinguishes itself from MLS security and makes it a viable security policy where MLS security is too strong.
Provenance labels. Tracking data provenance in curated databases has been the subject of recent study [1] . Here, a set of labels is associated with each sub-term of an expression e that is computed as a function of a labeled data set. For instance, e might be a term that computes statistical information from an array of sensor data by running an SQL query over the database. Each entry in the database is tagged with the identity of the sensor that produced the value. The labels on the sub-terms of e then reflect which sensor readings contributed to the computation of each subterm. It is possible to prove a noninterference-like theorem based on the dependences between the labeled term and the data sources. One could also derive other security policies from the provenance labels, stating, for instance, that only data from an authorized set of sources may participate in a particular computation.
User-defined label models in Fable. The preceding discussion illustrates that a label model for an SOPL needs to be flexible enough to accommodate a variety of security requirements. Furthermore, the particular choice of label model (e.g. choosing a rolebased language as a basis for labels) has implications on the interoperability of an application with other legacy systems that might use other policy languages (e.g. attribute-based access control used by NCES). We have developed a formal foundation for a secure programming framework that allows arbitrary safety policies to be expressed and enforced via user-defined label models. This system, Fable, is described in detail in a companion technical report [6] .
SECURE PROGRAMMING IN SELINKS
The multi-tier structure of the CPA, as well as the coordination between its multiple component applications presents several challenges for controlling the flow of sensitive data. The research we are conducting aims to provide a coherent treatment of flows across the entire application by scaling up the basic ideas of security-oriented programming languages. By using these techniques, we will have effectively constructed a lightweight, static proof of end-to-end security.
We are in the process of extending the LINKS [2] web programming language with support for enforcing fine-grained, security policies specified using object labeling. LINKS is novel in that it permits writing a single, multi-threaded program that is automatically split into client, server, and database components, and translated to JavaScript, LINKS, and SQL, respectively. The main advantage of using LINKS is that one can analyze a single program, before it is split into and compiled to its multi-lingual component parts. This makes the analysis task much simpler (and more trustworthy). Though space precludes a complete discussion, we attempt to provide the reader with a feel for LINKS programming by discussing a small example program. We call our extension of LINKS, Security Enhanced Links, or SELINKS. Figure 3 shows a small program with an emphasis on server-database interactions. Our technical report contains several other examples and the formal definitions of a type system to enforce security policies [6] . A LINKS program consists of a series of function definitions followed by some initialization code to start the application. Each function is labeled with either client or server annotation to indicate where it is supposed to run. Function calls may traverse the client/server gap, and the compiler automatically translates such calls into synchronous remote procedure calls (RPCs) -in the example, showWikiPage is a client function that makes a remote call to the server to fetch the page contents and then draws it to the screen.
Interactions with a database are primitive operations in LINKS. Any server function may connect to a database to perform queries and updates. The advantage here as shown in the function getPage, is that the database's data model is made evident in the LINKS program. This means that one can translate LINKS values to database rows and back again without the unwieldy usage of quoted SQL strings (as found in Java and JDBC) and and unsafe coercion functions that translate database result set types to types in the application language. In LINKS, database queries are expressed as list comprehensions. The example query selects all rows from the table pages where the page identifier is as requested. The function also performs some additional security operations which we discuss next.
At line 1, the signature of the function getPage describes its security behavior using a limited form of dependent typing. The function expects two formal parameters, the first of type Label and the second an Int. The Label type is an addition in SELINKS and stands for the type of label values; in this case, the kind of the Label is MLS, stating that this function only deals with MLS security (rather than access control, downgrading etc.). The function returns a list of Page elements, where each Page is at a security level not higher than the level specified by the cred parameter.
At line 4 in the body of the function, the database schema is updated to reflect the storage of Label values in the database, where previously only a user identifier was stored. Each field in each row of the "pages" table is at a security level determined by the Label stored in the same row. At line 9, we define an expression that selects documents from the table, but we must be careful to ensure that in line 10 the correct authorization check is performed in the where clause. In this case, we check in line 10 that the privilege level specified in cred is no less than the pglabel field of the row. Since we only select rows that satisfy this conditions, we can safely use subsumption to treat each selected record as being protected at level cred, which is the requirement stated in the type signature. Note that if the kind of the label was not MLS then some other form of authorization check would have to be performed at line 10. Notice that unlike the example from Section 3, the actual value of a security label is known only at runtime.
Ensuring complete mediation of the security policy requires three steps. First,a static analysis of SELINKS programs to ensure that all authorization checks, such as the label ordering check on line 11 of Figure 3 , are present. Second, complete mediation requires that object-label relationships represented in the type language of the SELINKS program (e.g Page{cred}) be consistent with the label-data relationship as maintained in the database. In the example in Figure 3 , the mapping between the database's view of objects and labels and the application's view is particularly straightforward -the object and the label are stored as a tuple in the database and in the application. However, much more complex relationship are possible, and necessary, for practical programs. When persisting or querying labeled data to/from the database, we must ensure that the object-label relationships are preserved. Finally, we must ensure that all policy checks that occur with SQL queries that run at the database are consistent with the corresponding policy checks that occur within the SELINKS program.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude by showing two screenshots from an prototype of the CPA that is under development. Figure 4 shows the interface that allows a user to manage his role labels. The top of the window shows the name of the role (in this case, the Auditors role belonging to the user Nix). The application provides a GUI to allow the user to add new users to the role, or to remove existing users from the role. Other operations such as delegating role management will also be supported. Figure 5 shows the interface that allows a user to view existing labels on a document and to possibly add new labels to the document. The contents of the page is structured into a tree-like structure of tables, with nested tables showing the labels associated with each labeled fragment of the document. A mouse over the label loads the set of labels in the pane toward the left of the frame. Designing an intuitive UI that is wellsuited to a security critical application is also a major challenge in this project and is an area which we have only just begun to explore.
Throughout this paper, we have attempted to give a flavor of our approach to address each of the key tasks and challenges of the CPA identified in Section 2. In review, we are developing a general secure programming framework, SELINKS, in which it is possible to express and enforce a variety of user-defined security policies. In the context of the CPA, the particular userdefined policies include an enhancement of techniques proposed by Buneman et al. [1] in order to accurately track provenance labels on data sources; we are using roles derived from the RT 0 language as dynamic labels to tag documents; and we have illustrated by example how the type system in SELINKS ensures complete mediation of policy authorization checks. The formal details of language-based enforcement of user-defined security policies are given in our technical report [6] .
Several challenges remain. We must reason about the validity of security policies and their enforcement. This is particularly challenging when policies can be composed in non-standard ways. We have identified two aspects to this task, with respect to the cross-domain setting. First, we wish to show that cross-domain policies provably meet high-level security goals using automated tools. Our technical report outlines preliminary work in this direction [3] . Second, we must show that the enforcement mechanism of a complex (composed) policy is consistent with the intended high-level security goals. Towards this end, we have developed a framework in which to make manifest the enforcement of security policies in a formally analyzable form. We plan to adapt techniques from interactive theorem proving to partially automate the validation of enforcement mechanisms with respect to high-level security goals [6] . In an orthogonal direction, as discussion in Section 2, we must extend our framework to accommodate more general distributed system topologies, accounting also for mobility.
